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THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERN
JURISPRUDENCE
Stephen M. Feldman*
For me the world has always been more of a puppet show. But when one
looks behind the curtain and traces the strings upward he finds they ter
minate in the hands of yet other puppets, themselves with their own
strings which trace upward in tum, and so on. In my own life I saw these
strings whose origins were endless enact the deaths of great men in vio
lence and madness.1

- Cormac McCarthy
What is the politics of postmodern jurisprudence? Forms of
postmodern interpretivism, including philosophical hermeneutics2 and
deconstruction,3 assert that we are always and already interpreting. This

* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. B.A. 1977, Hamilton; J.D. 1982, Oregon;
J.S.M. 1986, Stanford.-Ecl. I thank J.M. Balkin, Stanley Fish, Francis J. Mootz, Dennis
Patterson, Adam Thurschwell, Mark Tushnet, Steve Winter, and Brent Hendricks for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. CORMAC McCARTHY, ALL THE PR.mTY HORSES 231 (1992).
2. See HANS GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad Publishing Corp. 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960) [herein
after GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]. The leading analyses of Gadamer's work are
GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADmON AND REASON (1987)
and JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF Truth and
-

Method (1985).
3. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967) [hereinafter DERRIDA, GRAM·
MATOLOGY]; JACQUES DERRIDA, PosmoNs (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
1981) (1972) [hereinafter DERRIDA, PosmoNs ]; JACQUES DERRIDA, Cogito and the
History ofMadness, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 31 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi.
Press 1978) (1967); JACQUES DERRIDA, Differance, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 1
(Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Differance]; JAC

The Ends of Man, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 109; JAC·
From "Plato's Pharmacy," in DISSEMINATION, reprinted in A DER
RIDA READER 112 (Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Plato]; JACQUES
DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRIT
ING AND DIFFERENCE, supra, at 278 [hereinafter DERRIDA, Structure]; Jacques Der
rida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990) [hereinafter Derrida, Law]. For excellent discus
sions of deconstruction, see JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION (1982);
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA (1987); David Hoy, Jacques Derrida, in THE RE
TURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 41 (Quentin Skinner ed., 1985).
For an interesting comparison of Derrida and Gadamer, see G.B. MADISON, Beyond SeQUES DERRIDA,
QUES DERRIDA,
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assertion has provoked numerous scholarly attacks, many of which in
voke standard modernist hobgoblins such as textual indeterminacy, sol
ipsism, ethical relativism, and nihilism.4 From the modernist standpoint,
postmodern jurisprudence thus is either conservative or apolitical be
cause it lacks the firm foundations necessary for knowledge and cri
tique. In this article, I argue that these modernist attacks not only are
mistaken but that they also obscure the potentially radical political
ramifications of postmodern interpretivism.5
My discussion focuses on two recent and seemingly opposed arti
cles: Dennis Patterson's The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: To
ward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory6 and J.M. Balkin's Transcenriousness and Frivolity: A Gadamerian Response to Deconstruction, in THE HERME
NEUTICS OF POSTMODERNITY 106 (1988) (favoring the Gadamerian viewpoint).
4. For one recent attack on Derridean deconstruction as nihilistic and relativistic,
see Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law,
107 HARV. L. REV. 714, 716, 724-25 (1994).
5. For further essays in which I discuss postmodernism, including postmodern in
terpretivism, see Stephen M. Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American
Legal Thought: The Significance of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE (Bernard Schwartz ed., forthcoming 1996); Stephen M. Feldman, Di
agnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial Practice (with an
Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1046 (1994) [hereinafter Feldman, Diagnosing Power]; Stephen M. Feldman,
The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 16 IowA L. REv. 661
(1991) [hereinafter Feldman, New Metaphysics]; Stephen M. Feldman, Exposing Sun
stein's Naked Preferences, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1335 [hereinafter Feldman, Exposing]; Ste
phen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in
Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republi
canism, 81 GEO. LJ. 2243 (1993) [hereinafter Feldman, The Persistence of Power];
Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 679
[hereinafter Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn]. I also use a postmodern
approach to analyze the relations between power and the constitutional doctrine of sepa
ration of church and state in a forthcoming book: STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE
DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARA
TION OF CHURCH AND STATE (forthcoming 1996).
I rely heavily on the. following books and essays that focus on postmodernism:
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN. INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY (1992) [hereinafter
BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS]; STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989);
DAVID HARVEY. THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1989); FREDRIC JAMESON,
POSTMODERNISM. OR. THE CULTURAL Lome OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991); JEAN
FRAN<;OIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979);
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM (1990); FEMI
NISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990); Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi,

The Theory and Politics of Postmodernism: By Way of an Introduction, in
1 (Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990); Stephen
Crook, The End of Radical Social Theory? Notes on Radicalism, Modernism and
Postmodernism, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY, supra, at 46.
6. Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Recon
struction of Legal Theory, 72 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1993).
POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY
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dental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice.1 Patterson directly assails
postmodern interpretivism, which he refers to as "interpretive univer
salism "8 and "hermeneutic holism."9 According to Patterson, we must
reject interpretivism because it necessarily leads to an infinite regress of
interpretations: interpretivism sends us reeling into an abyss where we
can never grasp the meaning of a text because it constantly slips away
into another interpretation, another meaning - and another, and an
other, and another. In contrast to Patterson, Balkin identifies himself as
a deconstructionist - a type of postmodern interpretivist - and in fact,
Balkin's article can be read as an effort to respond to Patterson's con
cerns. Balkin acknowledges and directly confronts the potential nihilism
of deconstruction, and in doing so searches for a source of human val
ues. Specifically, Balkin attempts to identify the source of the human
desire or drive for justice. He concludes that "transcendent values," in
cluding justice, arise from "the wellsprings of the human soul," which
transcend "the creations of culture." 10
I shall argue that both Patterson and Balkin are wrong. Patterson
mischaracterizes postmodern interpretivism. It does not lead to an infi
nite regress of interpretations that undermines meaning, but rather, to
the contrary, interpretivism explains how meaning and understanding
are possible in the first place. We experience a meaningful being-in-the
world because we are always and already interpreting. Meanwhile,
Balkin errs by concluding that postmodern interpretivism, in the guise
of deconstruction, needs to be augmented in order to explain the human
desire for justice. Balkin underestimates the significant social and politi
cal implications of deconstruction: deconstruction itself can explain how
humans constantly quest after justice but never attain it. In short, the re
ality of postmodern interpretivism - the way of our being-in-the-world
- responds to both Patterson and Balkin. Interpretivism explains how
we come to understand a text, and simultaneously, how we have an in
exhaustible urge for justice.
Part I of this article describes and critiques Patterson's argument
against postmodern interpretivism and explores the relation between un
derstanding and interpretation. 11 In his article, Patterson focuses on
7. J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 1 13 1 (1994).
8. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 3.
9. See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
254, 314 (1992) [hereinafter Patterson, Postmodernism]. Patterson reiterates his criti
cisms ofinterpretivism in his recently published book, DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND
TRUTH 71-127 (1 996).
10. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1139.
1 1 . See infra Part I.
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Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish as "two exemplary proponents" 12 of

interpretivism.13 I do not attempt to defend either Dworkin or Fish; in

fact, Fish already has defended himself.14 Fish's defense, however, re
volved around his persuasive demonstration that Patterson had misread
Fish's corpus.15 Fish did not attempt to address the central questions
raised by Patterson: how does one come to understand a legal text, and
how are understanding and interpretation related?16 In critiquing Patter
son's position, Part I explores the importance of philosophical herme

neutics to the resolution of these questions. Part II focuses on

postmodern interpretivism and justice by first examinmg the relation
ship between philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction and then
critiquing Balkin's argument connecting justice and transcendental
deconstruction. Part II concludes by discussing how philosophical her

meneutics helps us to understand the meaning of justice and how

deconstruction feeds our inexhaustible urge for justice.17 Parts I and II

are tied together by their overlapping discussions of the political ramifi
cations of postmodern jurisprudence.
I.

ON

THE

A.

RELATION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND
INTERPRETATION

The Attack on Postmodern Interpretivism

How does one come to understand a legal text - or any other text,
for that matter? Because Patterson believes postmodern interpretivism
12. Patterson, supra note 6, at 3.
13. Patterson views Dworkin and Fish as being "united at the deepest level of
philosophical conviction." Id. at 6; see also Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Con
stitution, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 270, 279-93 (1993) (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITr, CON
STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)) (attacking both Dworkin and Fish). See gen
erally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY (1989); Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation
in the Law and in Literary Criticism, in THE PoLmcs OF INTERPRETATION 271
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983). To me, however, Fish's criticisms of Dworkin can be sum
marized in the statement that Dworkin is not interpretive enough. I tend to find Fish's
position much stronger than Dworkin's.
14. See Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis
Patterson, 72 TExAs L. REv. 57 (1993).
15. See id.; see also Steven L. Wmter, One Size Fits All, 72 TExAs L. REv. 1857,
1861 (1994) (calling Patterson's misreading of Fish "monstrous"). I agree with Fish's
assessment of Patterson's argument
16. Fish notes that he and Patterson use the word "interpretation" differently.
Nonetheless, Fish fails to pursue this important point by asking how we should use the
word, or whether it matters how we use it See Fish, supra note 14, at 64. For Patter
son's reply to Fish, see Dennis Patterson, You Made Me Do It: My Reply to Stanley
Fish, 72 TExA.s L. REv. 67 (1993).
17. See infra Part II.
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errs in response to this vital question, he focuses his assault on this is
sue. He launches his attack fairly enough by accurately presenting a ba
sic tenet of postmodern interpretivism: "our fundamental mode of
being-in-the-world is interpretive."18 His very next sentences, however,
demonstrate that he misconstrues the deep ontological significance of
this insight. He states: "To be is to be the bearer of an interpretive grid.
One comes to have a world by virtue of one's possession of an interpre
tive template laid against the external world, and the external world is
then rendered intelligible." 19 Thus, Patterson mistakenly construes inter
pretivism in modernist instead of postmodernist terms: he sharply sepa
rates the individual interpreter from an external world. The interpreter
seemingly possesses an interpretive template that she invokes to render
the alienated external world understandable. Patterson's rendition of in
terpretivism suggests a near-blind person {the interpreter) who gropes
about in a house (the external world) until she fortunately finds a pair
of glasses (the template). Suddenly, she can see - that is, understand
the world. In Patterson's words, interpretivists argue that texts can be
understood only "through some lens. "20 Indeed, Patterson suggests that
interpretivists believe that one can readily exchange one kind or shade
of glasses for another - say, green-tinted for rose-colored.
Because Patterson construes interpretivism in modernist terms, his
vision of the hermeneutic act is radically disjointed: interpretation is a
process that mediates between understanding and text. Patterson writes:
"[T]he act of interpretation is interposed between the utterance and our
grasp of its meaning. Interpretation is an act of mediation: Done cor
rectly, it results in the apprehension of meaning. Done poorly, compre
hension eludes us. "21 Thus, when postmodern interpretivists claim that
we are always and already interpreting, Patterson jumps up and ex
claims, "Impossible!" To Patterson, postmodern interpretivism mistak
enly sends the interpreter spinning into an infinite progression of inter-

18. Patterson, supra note 6, at 48. For example, Francis J. Mootz writes: "If a
core theoretical premise of contemporary hermeneutics exists, it is the universality of
the hermeneutical situation." Francis J. Mootz ill, The New Legal Hermeneutics, 47
vAND L. REv. 115, 126 (1994) (reviewing LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THE
ORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992)).
19. Patterson, supra note 6, at 48.
20. Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEXAS L. REv.
.

1837, 1846 (1994).
21. Patterson, supra note 6, at 20.
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pretations, an endless series of mediating acts. The interpreter thus
never quite grasps the meaning of the text.22
With textual indeterminacy gathering around our feet, Patterson
predictably declares that the mud and muck of relativism and solipsism
are about to gush forth into a life-threatening onslaught:
Because interpretations or perspectives can and do differ, there may in
principle be no way to choose between competing interpretations. The
slide to relativism is swift and sure, for there is no stopping the infinite
regress of interpretation. Every perspective begets another and so on and
so on. In the end, it seems, all we have are our own perceptions.23

Because of this impending solipsism and relativism, Patterson solemnly
pronounces that postmodern interpretivism threatens to wash away the
ground needed for social critique or critical theory: "Deconstruction,
and other versions of 'hermeneutic holism,' give us no place to start [a
critique]. Every place is as good as any other, so no particular set of
terms can be taken as the appropriate place to begin."24 Postmodern in
terpretivism, in the end, generates political conservatism.
What can save us from this interpretive slide to abysmal quietude?
Patterson's answer, of course, is Wittgensteinian pragmatism.25 Patter
son proclaims that "[t]he only way out of this vicious regress [of
postmodern interpretivism] is to recognize that the normativity of rule
guided behavior (e.g., law) lies not in the act of the individual (e.g., in
terpretation) but in a practice."26 The essential practice that saves us
from the disaster of interpretivism is understanding. Understanding, in

tum, is knowing how to participate in a practice: "[W]e have a world in
concert with others because we understand the manifold activities that
constitute that world. Catching on to and participating in these activities
- knowing how to act - is the essence of understanding. "27
Most important to Patterson, we must sharply distinguish under
standing from interpretation. Understanding is "primordial, "28 while in-

22. Patterson writes: "If all understanding were interpretation, then each interpre
tation would itself stand in need of interpretation, and so on, infinitely regressing to in
finity." Id. at 21.
23. Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
24. Patterson, Postmodernism, supra note 9, at 314 (footnotes omitted).
25. It is worth noting that some other commentators, contrary to Patterson, view
Wittgenstein himself more as a postmodern interpretivist See, e.g., SAUL A. KruPKE,
WITrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRlvATE LANGUAGE (1982); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781 (1989).
26. Patterson, supra note 6, at 21.
27. Id. at 55.
28. Id.
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terpretation is secondary.29 Understanding stands as

"unreflective lin

guistic practice, "30 whereas interpretation involves one's deliberate
reflection about the meaning of a text. Interpretation, therefore, emerges
asa

"second-order, reflective enterprise "31that

we engage in only if we

fail to understand a text immediately because its meaning is ambiguous
or otherwise unclear.32 Patterson argues:
The criterion for understanding an utterance is not engagement of a pro
cess; rather, it is acting appropriately in response to the utterance. For ex
ample, one evinces understanding of the request "Please pass the salt"
by passing the salt or by explaining why it is impossible to do so. Under
standing is made manifest in the act of passing the salt, and the act is a
criterion for having understood the utterance. Understanding is acting
properly in response to the request. If the request is vague or otherwise
opaque, interpretation of the request may be necessary,. otherwise not.
[Thus] interpretation is best thought of as an activity we engage in
when our understanding of an utterance is somehow in question (e.g., a
request to pass the salt when the salt is directly in front of the person
making the request). Interpretation is an activity of clarification - we
take the utterance in question and appraise competing construals or inter
pretations of it in an effort to clarify its meaning.33

nI short, the very act of interpretation depends upon the practice of
understanding

"already being in place."34 Understanding halts the infi

nite regress of interpretation by allowing us to grasp the meaning of a
text instead of spinning

wildly

finitum. Understanding appears

from one interpretation to another
asthe

talisman that saves us

tual indeterminacy, solipsism, relativism, and nihilism. Thus,

ad in

from tex
Patterson

concludes, postmodern interpretivists crucially fail to recognize that

29. Other Wittgensteinian pragmatists have argued in favor of this same distinction
between understanding and interpretation. See Richard Shusterman, Beneath Interpreta
tion: Against Hermeneutic Holism, 73 MONIST 181 (1990); James Tully, Wittgenstein
and Political Philosophy, 17 POL 'THEORY 172 (1989).
30. Patterson, supra note 6, at 54.
31. Patterson, Postmodemism, supra note 9, at 312.
32. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 54-55. Shusterman writes:
[T]hough all understanding is selective, not all selective understanding is inter
pretive. If understanding's selection is neither conscious nor deliberate but prer
eflective and immediate, we have. no reason to regard that selection or the resul
tant understanding as interpretation; since interpretation standardly implies some
deliberate or at least conscious thinking, while understanding does not.
Shusterman, supra note 29, at 190.
33. Patterson, supra note 6, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id. at 55. Shusterman observes that understanding gives a "meaning-giving
ground" on which to base interpretation. Shusterman, supra note 29, at 195.
.

"[ w]ithout understanding, interpretation
The central interpretivist claim,that
preting,must be
rate
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would

simply bite on air. "35

we are al ways and already inter

wrong because understanding stands prior to and sepa

from interpretation.
Of course, Patterson's conclusion hardly seems surpri�n
i g since he

ends exactly

where he began

-his conclusion merely reiterates his

premises. Patterson's argument can be summarized as follo ws: first,in
terpretivists declare that everything is interpretation;second,interpre
tivists describe interpretation as a mediating act that stands apart

from

other activities;and third,interpretivism represents confused thinking.

If,as

Patterson suggests,some activities clearly are not interpretive

because interpretation stands apartas a distinct mediating act

-

-then

interpretivists have constructed an analytically imprecise argument. Yet,
Patterson fails to consider the possibilitythat his

own mischaracteriza

tionof interpretivism

-rather than interpretivism itself

the apparent confusion

within the interpretivist position.

B.
Patterson's

-produces

Philosophical Hermeneutics

modernistportrayalof interpretivism moots his entire

argument. His attack on interpretivism may be some what interesting,
but it has nothing to do
ical hermeneutics of
read

with postmoderninterpretivism. The philosoph

Hans-Georg

Gadamer illustrates this point.36 To

Gadamer as undermining understanding resembles reading

Thomas

Kuhn as undermining science:it is to ske w the fundamental message.
Just as

Kuhn explains ho w scientists approach and understand their en

deavors,37 Gadamer explains ho w

we approach and come to understand

35. Patterson, Postmodemism, supra note 9, at 313. James Tully argues that inter
pretation, unlike understanding, never arrives at a practical use - it never reaches the
stage of application. See Tully, supra note 29, at 194-95.
36. To some extent, my criticism of Patterson arises from his failure to discuss
Gadamer. Yet, Patterson claims to attack interpretive universalism, not just Dworkin and
Fish, upon whom Patterson focuses. Furthermore, my desire to focus on Gadamer is not
so unusual as to be unfair or uncharitable to Patterson. To the contrary, more and more
legal scholars have begun to rely explicitly upon Gadamer. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Un
derstanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coher
ence, 103 YALE LJ. 105 (1993) [hereinafter Balkin, Understanding]; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990); Feld
man, New Metaphysics, supra note 5; David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Her
meneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985); Francis
J. Mootz, III, ls the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REv.
249 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal
Schol.
arship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992).
37. See THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLlITIONS (2d
ed. 1970).
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a text (or text-analogue).38 Indeed, from one perspective, "philosophical
hermeneutics is an attempt to identify the irreducible conditions of
human understanding."39
Gadamer maintains that an interpreter or reader is al ways situated
in

a

communal

"tradition "40 that

inculcates

the

individual

with

prejudices and interests. Those prejudices and interests necessarily
guide and limit understanding and communication.41 That is,communal
tradition and individual prejudices and interests constrain
possibly understand or see in a text. As

what one can

Gadamer says,the traditions of

one's communityhelp to shape the interpreter's

"horizon:" "the range

of vision that includes everything that can be seen

from a particular

vantage point. "42 Furthermore, tradition is not a thing of the past.

38. A text-analogue is any meaningful thing, event, or action that can be under
stood or read as if it were a text See CLIFFORD GEERTZ. Deep Play: Notes on the Ba
linese Cockfight, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 412, 448-49 (1973); Paul
Ricoeur, The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in INTERPRE
TIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE - A READER 73, 81 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan
eds., 1979). Gadamer himself has linked his philosophical hermeneutics to a Kuhnian
approach to science. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical
Hermeneutics, in PHILOSOPlDCAL APPRENTICESlDPS 177, 179 (Robert R. Sullivan
trans., 1985).
39. Gregory Leyh, Introduction to LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY,
AND PRACTICE xi, xii (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
40. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 282-84. In a similar
vein, Stanley Fish talks of the "interpretive community." See STANLEY FISH Is There
a Text in This Class?, in Is THERE A Truer IN Tms Cl.Ass? 303, 303-04 (1980);
Stanley Fish, Change, 86 S. ATLANTIC Q. 423, 423-24 (1987) [hereinafter Fish,
,

Change].
41. The r,oncept of prejudices comes specifically from Gadamer, while the concept
of interests is derived from Jiirgen Habermas. See, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer, The
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem (David E. Linge trans.), reprinted in JOSEF
BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 128, 133 (1980) [hereinafter Gadamer,
The Universality]. Habermas, in his early theory, argued that knowledge is possible only

because of human "interests." Habermas delineated only three "knowledge-constitutive
interests" - an interest in prediction and control, an interest in understanding of mean
ing, and an interest in emancipation. See JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND
HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Beacon Press 1971) (1968). I am, there
fore, using the concept of human interests in a much broader manner so that it resonates
with Gadamer's concept of prejudices. See also Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the
Uses of Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 1773, 1795 (1987) (contending that "already-in-place in
terpretive constructs are a condition of consciousness").
42. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 302; see id. at 306.
Steven Connor writes:
In trying to understand our contemporary selves in the moment of the present,
there are no safely-detached observation-posts, not in 'science', 'religion', or
even in 'history'. We are in and of the moment that we are attempting to analyze,
in and of the structures we employ to analyze it One might almost say that this
terminal self-consciousness . . . is what characterizes our contemporary or
'postmodern' moment

175

Postmodern Jurisprudence

October 1996]

Rather it is something in
torical beings

who

which

we constantly participate.We are his

livein tradition,just as

"[W]e are al ways situated

we live in a community
:

within traditions ...[ which are] al ways

part of us."43 We cannot escape or completely set aside tradition,
prejudices,and interests,yet at the same time, Gadamer maintains that
"tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what once existed. It
needs to be

affirmed,embraced,cultivated. "44

Significantly,although communal traditions and the concomitant
prejudices and interests constrain our possibilities for understanding and
communication,they simultaneously enable or empo wer us to commu
nicate and to understand.Whereas

Patterson insists that understanding

stands prior to interpretation, Gadamer reasons that understanding
makes sense only

within the hermeneutic or interpretive process. Our

traditions,prejudices,and interests actually open us to meaning,under
standing,and truth by generating and shaping our expectations for a
text: "the historicityof our existence entails that prejudices,in the lit
eral sense of the

word,constitute the initial directedness of our

whole

abilityto experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the
world."45 The hermeneutic act

-including understanding,interpreta

tion,and application -occurs only because

we already have cultivated

prejudices and interests by participating in communal traditions.46With
out our prejudices and interests, we
of understanding

would have no direction;the notion

would be nonsensical. Gadamer states that

to a tradition is a condition of hermeneutics,"47or in other
tion

"belonging
words,tradi

"makes understanding possible. "48
When

we

turnto a text, we anticipate or assume its completeness:

we assume that it can communicate some

"unityof meaning."49 Inter

pretation thus requires us to con front the text as
ing. The quest for meaning begins

with our

we search for its mean

"fore-understanding "of the

CONNOR, supra note 5, at 5.
43. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 282.
44. Id. at 281.
45. Gadamer, The Universality, supra note 41, at 133.
46. A Wittgensteinian perspective echoes philosophical heaneneutics on this point.
Gene Anne Smith writes:
[L]anguage is a practice, a technique, that we learn. It depends upon a given
community of understanding and established practices, to be sure. But this is re
quired not in order to verify my judgments. It is required to give the context in
which I can make meaningful judgments at all.
Gene Anne Smith, Wittgenstein and the Sceptical Fallacy, in WITTGENSTEIN AND LE
GAL THEORY 157, 179 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992) (footnote omitted).
47. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 291.
48. Id. at 329.
49. See id. at 293-94.
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text - a fore-understanding generated from our prejudices and inter
ests.50 This fore-understanding, however, is constantly adjusted as we
question the text, as we penetrate further and further into its meaning;51
we are "ceaselessly fonning a new preunderstanding."52 Through an in
teractive process consisting of understanding, questions, adjustments,
further questions, and so forth, the ultimate meaning of the text dialecti
cally "comes into being."53 In this sense, then, interpretation resembles
a conversation or dialogue between the interpreter and the text. Hence,
while one anticipates or fore-understands a particular meaning for a text
at the outset of interpretation, the dialogical process of hermeneutics
can lead one to arrive eventually at a different meaning. Regardless,
throughout this hermeneutic process, the interpreter continues to assume
that the text is intelligible, that it has a unity of meaning, although in
some instances an interpreter might finally conclude otherwise.
The metaphor of the hermeneutic circle elucidates the dialogical
nature of interpretation. Gadamer first presents the hermeneutic circle in
its simplest form: "It concerns the circular relation between the whole
[of a text] and its parts: the anticipated meaning of a whole is under
stood through the parts, but it is in light of the whole that the parts take
on their illuminating function."54 Gadamer, however, elaborates the her
meneutic circle by accounting for the interrelations between interpreter,
text, and tradition. According to Gadamer:
[The henneneutic circle] is not fonnal in nature. It is neither subjective
nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the move
ment of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of
meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjec
tivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition.
But this commonality is constantly being fanned in our relation to tradi
tion. Tradition is not simply a pennanent precondition; rather, we pro
duce it our5elves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution
of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of
understanding is not a "methodological" circle, but describes an element
of the ontological structure of understanding.ss

50. See id. at 332.
51. See id. at 267.
52. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Re
flection, in PHn.osoPmCAL HERMENEUTICS 18, 38 (David E. Linge ed. & trans.,
1976).
53. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 462; see id. at 101-69.
54. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Problem of Historical Consciousness, in INTER
PRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE
A READER, supra note 38, at 103, 146.
55. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 293. Elsewhere, I have
-

described the Gadamerian henneneutic circle as follows:
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In this reconceptualized hermeneutic circle, the meaning of a text
comes into being.56
Most important, in contrast to Patterson's Wittgensteinian ap
proach, Gadamer emphasizes the unity of the hermeneutic act. Whereas
Patterson insists that understanding and interpretation must be distin
guished sharply, Gadamer maintains that the hermeneutic event is "one
unified process. "57 To Gadamer, understanding, interpretation, a nd ap
plication are not distinct events, but rather they constitute the compo
nents of a unified hermeneutic act.58 We understand (or fore-understand)
a text only insofar as we open to its meaning because of our prejudices
derived from communal traditions; we develop prejudices only as we si
multaneously accept and reconstruct - or interpret - communal tradi
tions; and we understand and interpret texts as well as traditions only
insofar as we apply them to practical problems within our current hori
zon. We cannot extract any one component of this hermeneutic process,
such as understanding, and treat it as a primordial, uncontested, stable,
or noncontingent starting point.59

Interpretation has two sides: on the one side, tradition limits the vision of the in
terpreter as he or she approaches the text, yet on the other side, tradition does not
exist unless people constantly create and recreate it through the interpretive pro
cess itself. The latter side emphasizes that tradition is created as an ever new
meaning of the text comes into being: as we participate in tradition by interpret
ing texts, we transform and reconstitute that tradition. The two sides of interpre
tation are not separate and do not function independently, rather they are simulta
neous and interrelated. They resonate together as meaning comes into being
within the hermeneutic circle.
Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, supra note 5, at 711-12 (footnotes
omitted).
56. See GADAMER. TRurH AND METHOD. supra note 2, at 462; see id. at 164-

65.
57. Id. at 308.
58. See id. at 307-08, 340-41; Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 5, at 68384.
59. David Couzens Hoy writes:
[H]ermeneutics maintains that understanding is always already interpretation,
suggesting thereby that understanding is always conditioned by the context in
which it occurs. Similarly, understanding is always already application in the
sense that the understanding not only arises from a contextual background but
also focuses specific features of the context, highlighting some and thereby
reconfiguring the context in the very act of reaching an understanding of the spe
cific statute.
David Couzens Hoy, Intentions and the Law: Defending Hermeneutics, in LEGAL HER
MENEUTICS: HISTORY. THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 173, 174; see Fred
Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 3, 13-15 (describing hermeneutics as a uni
fied process).
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Gadamer's notion of a unified hermeneutic act directly corresponds
with his metaphysical stance. Contrary to Patterson's characterization of
interpretivism, Gadamer explicitly rejects modernist metaphysics, which
opposes an autonomous subject or interpreter against an objective text.
Thus, a text is not an object in a foundationalist sense - no uninter
preted source of meaning stands outside of or prior to interpretation.60
Instead, no matter what we do, we are always and already interpreting.
In Gadamer's terms, hermeneutics is ontological.61 Our very being-in
the-world is interpretive, and hence, we can never escape interpretation
and understanding. Moreover, each interpretive encounter is itself onto
logical. For example, Gadamer argues that when one views a picture,
one does not approach it as a subject to an object; rather, the picture is
an "ontological event"62 in which "being appears, meaningfully and
visibly."63 The hermeneutic act, then, is an ontological event in which
meaning "comes into being."64 This ontological hermeneutics leaves no
room for a disjointed hermeneutic act that would radically separate un
derstanding and interpretation. Understanding, interpretation, and appli
cation must remain conceptually and sociologically united to maintain
the ontological quality of hermeneutics. That is, understanding, interpre
tation, and application all are necessary components of the ontological
event in which meaning comes into being.65
This vision of a unified hermeneutic act is of paramount impor
tance in responding to Patterson's major criticisms of postmodern inter
pretivism. Basically, Patterson articulates two related charges. First, he
claims that understanding must be distinguished from interpretation: un
derstanding is primary and prereflective, while interpretation is secon
dary and reflective. Second, he claims that if understanding and inter
pretation are not sharply differentiated - if understanding is construed
as a type of interpretation - then we fall into an infinite regress of in-

60. As Fish claims:
[T]here is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal meaning one means a
meaning that is perspicuous no matter what the context and no matter what is in
the speaker's or hearer's mind, a meaning that because it is prior to interpretation
can serve as a constraint on interpretation.
STANLEY FISH, Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY, supra note 13, at 4; see Stanley E. Fish, With the Compliments of
the Author: Reflections on Austin and De"ida, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 693, 700 (1982).
61. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 137, 159, 477-91.
62. Id. at 140; see id. at 144.
63. Id. at 144; see id. at 489.
64. Id. at 462; see id. at 164-65.
65. In discussing the aesthetic experience of art, Gadamer notes: "Understanding
must be conceived as a part of the event in which meaning occurs, the event in which
the meaning of all statements . .. is formed and actualized. " Id. at 164-65.
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terpretations that dooms us to solipsistic relativism. In response to the
first charge, if the hermeneutic act is a unity, as Gadamer maintains,
then understanding and interpretation cannot be sharply separated.
Neither understanding nor interpretation stands prior to the other, but
instead they resonate in a reciprocal, dialectical relationship. In a sense,
then, understanding is merely a momentary pause in interpretation. Un
derstanding is a moment when the interpreter senses, at least tempora
rily, that she has arrived at the meaning of the text. Yet, simultaneously,
the whole point or purpose of interpretation is to reach understanding;
consequently, to talk of interpretation as independent of understanding
is nonsensical. Understanding is always interpretive, but interpretation
is nothing but the movement of understanding.66
What does it mean, though, to assert that understanding is always
interpretive? To Gadamer, it means nothing more than that we always
open to and reach understanding only because of and through our
prejudices and interests, which are derived from our communal tradi
tions. Even understanding that is prereflective necessarily arises only
because of our traditions and prejudices. In other words, even when one
does not deliberate consciously about the meaning of the text, but rather
appears to grasp its meaning immediately, that immediate grasp is pos
sible only because the individual is situated within a horizon constituted
by traditions and prejudices. In Stanley Fish's words: "A

meaning that

seems to leap off the page, propelled by its own self-sufficiency, is a
meaning that flows from interpretive assumptions so deeply embedded
that they have become invisible."67
Furthermore, communal traditions neither are fixed, precisely
bounded entities, nor are they passed on to individuals through some
precise method or mechanical process. Balkin provocatively suggests
that traditions are akin to "cultural software" insofar as they "become
part of us and shape the way that we perceive the legal and social
world."68 Nonetheless, traditions differ from computer software pro-

66. In a related vein, Hayden White writes:
Understanding is a process of rendering the unfamiliar ... familiar; of removing
it from the domain of things felt to be "exotic" and unclassified into one or an
other domain of experience encoded adequately enough to be felt to be humanly
useful, nonthreatening, or simply known by association. This process of under
standing can only be tropological in nature, for what is involved in the rendering
of the unfamiliar into the familiar is a troping that is generally figurative.
HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: EsSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 5
(1978).
67. STANLEY FISH, Still Wrong After All These Years, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY, supra note 13, at 356, 358.
68. Balkin, Understanding, supra note 36, at 167; see id. at 142.
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ways:traditions cannot be reduced to a

fixed

quantum of data like computer soft ware programs,and traditions cannot
be

perfectlyinstalled or copied into each of us. To the contrary,tradi

tions themselves take hold of us only through an interpretive process;
traditions address us and must be absorbed or learned -often tacitly or
unconsciously.69 Moreover,traditions are not static;they are constantly
evolving,communal,social

arran
gements and memories

within

which

we participate and live.70 In short,even the most immediate and pre
reflective cognitive processes arise exactly because one has interpre
tively absorbed communal traditions (and this absorption is often itself
prereflective). Consequently,understanding cannot possibly precede in
terpretation; we can never bypass interpretation to directly access the
meaning of a text. Indeed,the ontological quality of the hermeneutic act
underscores that the concept of a textual meaning standing prior to in
terpretation is nonsensical. As
occasional,post

Gadamer

writes: " nterpretation
I
is not an

facto supplement to understanding;rather,understand

ing is al ways interpretation,and hence interpretation is the explicit form
of understanding. In accordance

with this insight,interpretive language

and concepts [are] recognized as belonging to the inner structure of
understanding."71
Thus, ifunderstanding and interpretation are not sharply differenti
ated, what of Patterson's second charge:that

we are thro wn into an infi

nite regress of interpretations that dooms us to solipsistic relativism?
Once again,the notion of a unified hermeneutic act ans wers this criti
cism. The unified hermeneutic act includes understanding,interpreta
tion,and

application. The element of application underscores that the

hermeneutic act is al ways a practical or concrete activity. Gadamer ar
gues that

when

we approach a text, we ty pically do so for the purpose

of understanding its meaning. For that reason, we anticipate the com
pleteness of the text and assume it can communicate a

"unity of mean

ing."72 Other wise,the hermeneutic act becomes merely hypothetical. n
I
terpretation occurs in a concrete context, not in some hypothetical,

69. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 461-63; see also J.M.
as Cultural Software, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1221-23 (1995) (ac
knowledging drawbacks of the metaphor of cultural software).
70. In a related vein , Anthony Giddens writes: "[T]ransient encounters of daily
life cannot be conceptually separated from the long-term development of institutions.
The most casual exchange of words involves the speakers in the long-term history of
the language via which their words are formed, and simultaneously in the continuing re
production of that language. ,, ANTHONY GIDDENS, PROFILES AND CRITIQUES IN SO
CIAL THEORY 11 (1982).
71. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 307.
72. See id. at 293-94.
Balkin, Ideology
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abstract never-never land. In the reality of a concrete context, we are
able to grasp the point of a text without slipping into an infinite regress
bereft of meaning.73
Moreover, neither traditions nor prejudices are mere mental forms
or ideas that can be replaced by simply imagining different forms or
ideas. Prejudices and interests often are learned or absorbed in a deep
sense; they become embodied in individuals. Prejudices and interests,
then, are not like a pair of rose-colored glasses that can be removed and
replaced with a pair of green-tinted glasses. To the contrary, once en
trenched or learned, particular prejudices and interests are not easily
changed or shaken, though they always remain contingent and poten
tially alterable.74
Additionally, prejudices, interests, and traditions arise from and are
constituted by experiences that are mediated through language. And lan
guage, as a practical activity, is communicated through concrete exper
iences and actions.75 For example, a child learns through a multitude of
social interactions the meaning of being a doctor in our society. The
child might be a patient of a doctor who talks to and physically treats

73. At a particular point in time, a text can seem to have a multiplicity of mean
ings only if we imagine it as decontextualized, as existing in some abstract sense. But
as Stanley Fish notes, we always encounter a text in a concrete context, and hence, the
text always has a determinate meaning (though that meaning can change as the context
changes). See Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech

Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other
Special Cases, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE
A READER, supra note 38, at
-

243, 256.
74. To me, Gadamer does not adequately make this point, although it is implicit in
his approach.
Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the embodiment of a practice suggests that prejudices
and interests should be understood not merely as a "state of mind," but as a "state of
the body." See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE Lome OF PRACTICE 68 (Richard Nice trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 1990) (1980). In fact, Bourdieu writes that "[l]anguage is a body
technique." PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 86 (John B.
Thompson ed. & Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1991) (1982). Thus, we might understand language and tradition as being, in the words
of Julia Annas, "socially embodied" or "embodied in various forms of social life."
Julia Annas, Macintyre on Traditions, 18 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 388, 388-89 (1989) (dis
cussing Alasdair Maclntyre's notion of tradition); see Feldman, The Persistence of
Power, supra note 5, at 2258-61 (criticizing Habermas's argument that we can separate
symbolic reproduction in a Iifeworld from material reproduction).
75. James Boyd White writes:
[O]ur acts of language are actions in the world, not just in our minds. Even when
we think we are simply communicating information, or being rigorously and ex
clusively intellectual, or just talking, we are in fact engaged in performances, in
relation to others, that are ethical and political in character and that can be judged
as such.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION ix (1990).
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the child;the child mi h
gt see his or her parents or other individuals in
teract

with physici n
as;the child mi h
gt hear different people discuss

doctors;and the child mi h
gt read books or

watch movies or television

sho ws that po rtr
ay physicians. Over time, the child thus acquires the
meanin gof bein ga doctor throu h
g the accumulation of these exper
iences, althou g
h the meanin g is

la ways mediated

That is, these social experiences

hrou
t
h
g lan u
ga g
e.

g
ain meanin g
ful shape only hrou
t
h
g

lin g
uistic concepts already existin gin he
t community
. Thus, the child

talksin a particular manner, performs

eventually learns that a doctor
certain tasks, and

wears a certain ty
pe of clo hin
t
g
. The child, in effect,

c arr
ies these ch racteristics
a
as prejudices hat
t shape the child's concep
tion or fore-understandin gof the role of physicians in the community.
The child does not acquire these prejudices in some ideal

world of ab

stractions;instead, the child concretely experiences doctors and repre
sentations or portray las of them.76
At this point, it is

worth notin gthat my ar g
ument mer g
es close to

Patterson's ar g
ument. Patterson

ra g
ues that underst n
adin g
, as a practice

or practical activity
, provides the foo ti
n g hat
t prevents us
into

n
a

infini
te interpretive re gr
ess. Ino w

from slidin g

ra g
ue that postmoderninter

pretivism does not send us slidin ginto an in fi
nite interpre ive
t re g
ress
because he
t uni fi
ed hermeneutic act includes the practical component of
application. In fact, the similaritybet ween our

ra g
uments on this point

su gg
es st that, perhaps, the differences bet ween our entire positions
less than at

first appeared. Maybe the distinction bet ween

rae

Patterson's

Witt g
ensteinian pra g
matism and my postmoderninterpretivism is the
proverbial distinction

wi hout
t
a difference.77 A ft
er all,

hermeneutic foundationalism, nd
a

we bo ht reject

we both emphasize prere fl
ective co g


nition. Maybe, then, he
t disa g
reement is no more han
t
a dispute over
sem ntics.
a
Patterson re fe
rs,

first, to understandin gas prereflective co 
g

nitive activityand, second, to interpre ation
t
as deliberate reflection on
the meanin gof a text. Ire fe
r to

allco n
gi ive
t activities,

whe her
t re fl
ec

tive or prere fl
ective, as hermeneutic acts hat
t
include an interpretive
component.

76. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC
TION OF REALITY (1967); Feldman, Exposing, supra note 5, at 1341-43 & nn.39-42;
Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, supra note 5, at 710-11. See generally
LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL lNvEsTIGATIONS 19e (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans. , 3d ed. 1958) (arguing that language is a form of life, and hence , philosophical
questions arise when "language goes on holiday").
77. See generally RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, What Is the Difference that Makes a
Difference? Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 58 (1986)
(discussing whether the distinctions among Gadamer, Habermas , and Rorty are
significant).
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In fact, I believe that with a bit of tinkering, we might get our defi
nitions to match, and our disagreement would dissolve - almost. There

is an additional problem. Our disagreement about terminology manifests
a sharp political difference between us. Patterson attacks postmodern in

terpretivism for textual indeterminacy, solipsistic relativism, and ulti
mately, political conservatism. In fact, many others also have charged
Gadamer with conservatism for too readily accepting the authority of
tradition and the conventional meaning of the text.78 Ironically, how
ever, this charge of political conservatism applies more accurately to
Patterson than to Gadamer. Patterson's concept of understanding em
bodies an uncritical acceptance of the normal or conventional. To
Patterson, understanding arises from "conventional meanings"79 and is
expressed by acting "properly"80 or " appropriately"81 in response to an
utterance or request; acting improperly apparently indicates misunder
standing, not resistance or criticism. Indeed, most tellingly, the crux of
Patterson's argument seems to be that postmodern interpretivism goes
wrong because it requires us (at least in his opinion) to use the terms
"understanding" and "interpretation" in unconventional or unusual
ways.82 According to Patterson's Wittgensteinian pragmatism, the mere
fact that we ordinarily use words in a particular manner invests that us
age with some normative priority or a presumption of rightness.83 Meta
phorically

speaking,

Patterson

tries

to

re-execute

Socrates

(the

postmodern interpretivists) for questioning tradition.84 Hence, unsurpris-

78. See, e.g., John D. Caputo, Gadamer's Closet Essentialism: A Derridean Cri
tique, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION 258, 258-59 (Diane P. Michelfelder &
Richard E. Palmer eds., 1989); Jiirgen Habermas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and
Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 335, 359-60 (Fred R. Dallmayr
& Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Tum in Mod
ern Theory: A Tum for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 874, 892, 957 (1989).
79. Patterson states that we engage in interpretation only "when conventional
meanings are called into question. [Therefore] interpretation is dependent upon conven
tional understanding and practice." Patterson, supra note 6, at 54-55 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 20.
82. For example, Patterson claims that interpretive universalism is "born of a lack
of attention to some obvious features of ordinary understanding." Id. at 3. He contin
ues: " [T]his [interpretive] account of the nature of legal understanding is profoundly
misleading. It turns the ordinary into the mysterious, and it fails to account for the fact
that understanding and interpretation are distinct activities." Id. at 7.
83. For example, Richard Shusterman insists that we must distinguish understand
ing as prereflective cognition from interpretation as reflective activity in order to defend
the ordinary use of the word understanding. See Shusterman, supra note 29, at 195-99.
He writes that "interpretation standardly implies some deliberate or at least conscious
thinking, while understanding does not." Id. at 190.
84. See generally RICHARD TARNAS. THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND
26-35 (1991) (comparing the Sophists, as skeptical pragmatists, with Socrates).
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ingly, when Patterson muses about "the task of jurisprudence,"85 he in
sists that it is largely descriptive, not critical: "The task of jurispru
dence is the accurate description of the forms of argument used by
lawyers to show the truth of propositions of law."86 That is, jurispru
dence should describe how lawyers use words in the practice of law. In
short, Patterson's fear of relativism and nihilism induces him to retreat
toward a Burkean acceptance of tradition and conventions.87
Whereas Patterson seems truly conservative, Gadamer is poten
tially radical in two ways. First, Gadamer insists that the interpreter
must risk her prejudices by opening up to the meaning of the text.
Gadamer refuses to endorse a hermeneutic vision in which an inter
preter blithely imposes her preferred meaning on the text. Rather, the
hermeneutic act should be a conversational or dialogical exchange be
tween the interpreter and text. Through this hermeneutic act, the inter
preter changes as meaning comes into being. Second, Gadamer's philo
sophical hermeneutics contains a potential deconstructive component.
While Gadamer emphasizes the anticipation of a complete and unified
textual meaning, his approach also implicitly contains the seeds for a
deconstructive attack on the conservative acceptance of textual mean
ing.88 To develop this second point, I will now turn to Derridean decon
struction and Balkin's argument concerning justice.

85. Patterson, supra note 6, at 56.
86. Id. Patterson continues by arguing:
Jurisprudence should tum its attention away from the fixation on interpretation
and study the ways in which lawyers go about the task of justifying propositions
of law. Finally, we must continue to pay attention to the ways in which the mean
ing of law is called into question and rival interpretations adjudicated.
Id. (footnote omitted). Even here, where Patterson hints at a more critical purpose
for jurisprudence, he casts it in a largely descriptive manner. He does not recommend
intervening or participating in the questioning of the meaning of law, but rather he sug
gests that we "pay attention" to the ways in which such questioning ordinarily occurs.
It is not until the very last sentence of the article that Patterson finally suggests a
stronger critical stance when he writes: " [T]he central task of jurisprudence is the per
spicuous description and critical appraisal of our practices of legal justification." Id.
87. Cf. George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurispru
dence, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 545, 549, 558-65 (1996) (arguing that to later Wittgen
stein and his followers, philosophy should be purely descriptive of ordinary language;
therefore, critics have charged that this ordinary language type of approach to philoso
phy fails to seek to critique and reconstruct language); see also Wmter, supra note 15,
at 1867.
88. Cf. Gerald L. Bruns, Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of the Legal Text, in
LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE supra note 39, at 23, 26
(arguing that Gadamer can be interpreted as reactionary or radical).
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O N POSTMODERN lNTERPRETIVISM AND JUSTICE
The Relation Between Philosophical Hermeneutics and
Deconstruction

As a manifestation of postmodern interpretivism, Derridean decon
struction shares much in common with philosophical hermeneutics.89
No less so than hermeneutics, deconstruction can be understood � an
attempt to identify the irreducible conditions of human understanding.90
Both Gadamer and Derrida explore how we come to understand texts
despite rejecting the foundationalist metaphysics of modemism.91 In
Derridean terms, meaning is never grounded on a stable signified;
rather, there "is always already" a play of signifiers.92 Derrida states:
From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We
think only in signs. Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign . . . . .
One could call play th e absence o f the transcendental signified as limit

lessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of . . . the metaphysics
of presence.93
•

Hence, deconstruction echoes the central ontological tenet of her
meneutics that we are always and already interpreting. As Derrida says,

89. Many critics of deconstruction mistakenly assume that it "encourages the idea
of criticism as a kind of free-for-all hermeneutic romp, an activity where no constraints
apply save those brought to bear by some arbitrary set of interpretative codes and con
ventions." NORRIS, supra note 5, at 137. I agree with Norris, Balkin, Staten, and others
who argue that this characterization of deconstruction presents only one (distorted) man
ifestation of it; Derrida does not subscribe to this type of "sophistical freeplay." Id. at
151; see id. at 49-53, 140; HENRY STATEN, WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA (1984);
Balkin , supra note 7, at 1 152.
90. See supra text accompanying note 39; cf. Diane Michelfelder & Richard
Palmer, Introduction to DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 18, at 1, 7-9
(noting that it can be argued that Derrida is the supreme hermeneutician of the twentieth
century, and Gadamer the ultimate deconstructionist).
91. The relation between Derrida and Wittgenstein is, of course, problematic.
Compare STATEN, supra note 89, at 1, 64-108 (claiming that the later Wittgenstein
achieves a consistent deconstructionist standpoint, in the Derridian sense) with
NEWfON GARVER & SEUNG-CHONG LEE, DERRIDA AND WITTGENSTEIN (1994)
(arguing that though Wittgenstein and Derrida share similarities, Wittgenstein presents
the stronger position considering their significant differences).
92. Derrida writes that "the signified is originarily and essentially (and not only
for a finite and created spirit) trace, that it is always already in the position of the signi
fier." DERRIDA, GRAMMATO LOGY supra note 3, at 73; see id. at 47, 50; see also
JAMESON, supra note 5, at 96. Derrida and Gadamer use the term "play" in different
ways. See Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and Deconstruction: Gadamer and De"ida in
Dialogue, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 75, 82; Neal Ox
enhandler, The Man with Shoes of Wind: The De"ida-Gadamer Encounter, in DIA
LOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 265, 266.
93. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 50; see DERRIDA, PosmoNS,
supra note 3, at 20.
,
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there is no foundation for the "coming into being" of signs.94 The con
tinual play or coming into being of signs or signifiers relates to Der
rida's central concept of differance.
[T]he signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient
presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every
concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the
other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences.
Such a play, differance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the
possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in gen
eral. For the same reason, differance, which is not a concept, is not sim
ply a word, that is, what is generally represented as the calm, present,
and self-referential unity of concept and phonic material.95

Just as Gadamer emphasizes that our prejudices arise from com
munal traditions, Derrida argues that we always borrow concepts "from
the text of a heritage. "96 We can never escape our heritage or, in
Gadamerian terms, step outside of our horizon. According to Derrida,
we are limited to "givens belonging to the discourse of our time,"97 and
hence, even "deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its
own work. "98 That is, deconstruction always necessarily uses and rein
scribes the metaphysics and linguistic structures that it seeks to decon
struct.99 Moreover, to Derrida, as well as to Gadamer, the givens of our

94. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 48.
95. DERRIDA, Differance, supra note 3, at 1 1 . Derrida further states:
The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid
at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself,
referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no
element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself
being con
is not simply present. T his interweaving results in each "element"
stituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or
system. This interweaving, this textile, is the t ext produced only in the transfor
mation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the sys
tem, is anywhere ever simply present or absent.There are only, everywhere, dif
ferences and traces of traces
. . . Differance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differ
ences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This
spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of differance indicates this
indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by
or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals
without which the "full" terms would not signify, would not function.
DERRIDA, PosmoNs, supra note 3, at 26-27.
96. DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 3, at 285.
97. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 70.
98. Id. at 24.
99. Derrida describes this process as follows:
[A]ll these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of
circle.This circle is unique.It describes the form of the relation between the his
tory of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no
.

.

•

.

.

•

.
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heritage - our communal traditions - neither are fixed and precisely
bounded entities nor are they passed on to individuals through some
precise method or mechanical process.100

If philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction share so much in
common, then what are the differences? In a sense, Gadamer pauses to
celebrate moments of meaning and truth, while Derrida does not.101
Both Gadamer and Derrida stress that any text or event has many po
tential meanings, many possible truths; no single meaning remains fixed
or stable in all contexts. Both would agree that "truth keeps happen
ing."102 Yet, while Gadamer therefore considers the meaning of a text to
be inexhaustible, Derrida considers it undecidable.103 To Gadamer, a de
terminate meaning arises in each concrete context, but because contexts
can vary, the potential meaning of a text is never exhausted. Gadamer,
as

already discussed, emphasizes that the unified hermeneutic act in

cludes a practical component (application), so that we anticipate the
completeness of the text and assume it can communicate a "unity of
meaning." 104 Thus, because Gadamer focuses on the practicality of the
hermeneutic act, he tends to view understanding primarily as a positive
and empowering experience.105
Gadamer consequently downplays the deconstructive component
that presents itself in the hermeneutic act, even as he implicitly suggests
it. He explains that our prejudices both enable and constrain under
standing and interpretation. Prejudices not only open us to the possibil
·
ity of understanding, but they also necessarily constrain and direct our
understanding and communication. One's life within a community and
its cultural traditions thus always limits or distorts one's range of vision,

sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphys
ics. We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is foreign to this
history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not al
ready had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of pre
cisely what it seeks to contest
DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 3, at 280-81.
100. See BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS, supra note 5, at 23.
.
101. In more mundane terms, if Gadamer and Derrida were looking at a glass of
water, Gadamer probably would say it is half full, while Derrida likely would say it is
half empty.
102. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9; see id. at 200 (noting that the truth of a
text exceeds each understanding); cf. BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS, supra note 5, at 3 1
(stating that postmodern culture "is characterized by the overabundance o f meanings").
103. See MADISON, supra note 3, at 1 15; Hoy, supra note 3, at 54.
104. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND MErnoo, supra note 2, at 293-94.
105. See MADISON, supra note 3, at 1 13-14 (observing that Gadamer's emphasis
on application separates hermeneutics from deconstruction).
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o: what one can possibly perceive or understand.106 Furthermore,
Gadamer emphasizes that because we are historical beings who live in
tradition, just as we live in a community, tradition is something in
which we constantly participate. Thus, we constantly constitute and re
constitute our tradition, our culture, and our community as we engage
in hermeneutic actions.107 This constant reconstitution always is simulta
neously constructive and destructive. On the one hand, it is constructive
because we constantly build new traditions and communities, constantly
adding to our already existing traditions and communities through inter
pretation and understanding. Through hermeneutic actions, we include
new concepts, interests, prejudices, and participants in our traditions
and communities. On the other hand, this reconstitution is also destruc
tive - distortive and exclusive - insofar as we weaken or eliminate
previously existing traditions and communities and exclude concepts,
interests, prejudices, and participants.108 In short, as Gadamer articulates
the hermeneutic act, interpretation and understanding are distortive and

destructive in two ways: first, our prejudices are manifestations of
power that constrain the possibilities for understanding; and second, the
reconstitution of tradition (also a manifestation of power) necessarily
destroys and excludes certain prejudices, interests, and participants.

Consequently, coercion, domination, exclusion, and other distortive ef
fects of power are always part of the hermeneutic act.109 The decon
structive component of hermeneutics hides within these destructive and

distortive effects.

Thus, Gadamer's articulation of philosophical hermeneutics con
tains deconstructive potential, yet he fails to pursue it.110 Here, then, is

106. See STANLEY FISH, Critical Self-Consciousness, or Can We Know What
We're Doing?, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 436, 450-55 (1989).
107. See JAMES BoYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING (1984);
James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REv. 835, 867 (1986).
108. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17 (1988) (claiming
that whenever a community rests upon an authoritative text, different modes of interpre
tation are likely to splinter that community); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 91 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALB LJ. 1601 (1986); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 241 1, 2414-15 (1989) (arguing that storytelling
both builds and destroys community).
109. See Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 2262-66; Feldman,
Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, supra note 5, at 705-31; cf. James Risser, The
Two Faces of Socrates: Gadamer/Derrida, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 78, at 176, 179-83 (suggesting that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics
has deconstructive potential).
1 10. Gadamer's grasp of the deconstructive potential of philosophical hermeneu
tics emerges most clearly in his criticism of Habermas's ideal speech situation. See
Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 2258-66; Hoy, supra note 3, at 61-
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the crux of the distinction between Gadamer and Derrida. Whereas
Gadamer focuses on the constructive and enabling power of the herme
neutic situation, Derrida focuses on its destructive and disabling compo
nent. Yet both parts are always and already present, as if there were a
hermeneutic and sociological law of conservation of power: if a herme
neutic act produces meaning and empowers certain individuals and so
cietal groups, it simultaneously represses and destroys potential mean
ing and

disempowers

other

individuals and groups.111

Thus,

for

example, Gadamer describes how tradition enables us to open to the
meaning of a text, but Derrida warns us that the authority of tradition is
"purchased by deep violence."112 Tradition opens us to understanding
because in part it provides an authoritative background context for the
hermeneutic act; tradition thus operates most effectively when it is for
gotten from conscious memory. But Derrida wants to remind us about
tradition, to bring the background to the foreground, and to underscore
how tradition often establishes its authority through brutality and
duplicity.
Because Derrida concerns himself with the disempowering and de
structive quality of the hermeneutic situation, he cares little about de
ciding among the many potential meanings or truths of a text. Dis
empowerment, quite simply, is not about making decisions; rather, it is
about lacking the power to decide. Derrida is not interested in the prac
tical component of the hermeneutic act since he does not seek to pursue
or reconstruct a unified meaning for the text. To the contrary, Derrida
seeks to find and highlight the trace of the Other that always hides in
the margins of our understanding. Derrida seeks to uncover the violence
that necessarily exists when we understand a text - the violence that is
inevitably obscured in the practical quest for a usable and therefore uni
fied meaning. To Derrida, violence manifests itself in the hermeneutic
definition, exclusion, denial, and oppression of the Other - a con
cealed outsider - and stands as an irreducible condition (or limit) of

62. However, John Brenkman argues that Gadamer does not sufficiently recognize the
distortive power of tradition; rather, he accepts tradition as authoritative. See JOHN
BRENKMAN, CuLTURE AND DOMINATION 30-38 (1987); cf. WARNKE, supra note 2,
at 91, 99 (questioning whether Gadamer conservatively accepts tradition).
1 1 1. I do not mean to suggest that the total value or quantity of power always re
mains the same through all social and hermeneutic events. Rather, I suggest that every
hermeneutic event is both constructive and destructive, though any particular event may
be more one than the other. Cf. Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at
2282-88 (noting that not all traditions and communities are equally distortive and
exclusive).
1 12. Caputo, supra note 78, at 263.
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human understanding. 1 1 3 Within the hermeneutic process of understand
ing, we always and already define some Other; we necessarily deny the
potential meanings arising from some other perspective and exclude
those potential meanings from our communal traditions. Without the
. Other, without the trace of denied potential meaning, "no meaning
would appear" at all. 11 4 Indeed, the Other is not just on the outside, but
rather the Other is the outside - the location of the Other defines the
outside. 115 Thus, understanding is a political act because, in announcing
the meaning of the text, it normatively and substantively defines inside
and outside. No preexisting border exists. Hence, Derridean deconstruc
tion also is political: it uncovers the hidden, the oppressed, the violated,
the denied - the Other.1 1 6 Gadamer may want to open to the Otherness
of the text, but Derrida wants to reveal the Otherness suppressed by our

understanding of the text.
An imaginary dialogue between Gadamer and Derrida might go as
follows:
Gadamer: "Our participation in tradition enables us to understand
texts."

1 13. Derrida states:
The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, articulates its possibil
ity in the entire field of the entity . . . which metaphysics has defined as the be
ing-present starting from the occulted movement of the trace. The trace must be
thought before the entity. But the movement of the trace is necessarily occulted,
it produces itself as self-occultation. When the other announces itself as such, it
presents itself in the dissimulation of itself. . . . The field of the entity, before be
ing determined as the field of presence, is structured according to the diverse
possibilities - genetic and structural - of the trace. The presentation of the
other as such, that is to say the dissimulation of its "as such," has always already
begun and no structure of the entity escapes it.
DERRIDA. GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 47.
Norris places Derrida in the Kantian tradition insofar as Derrida seeks to identify
the irreducible conditions of human understanding. But, as Norris points out, Derrida
uses the Kantian transcendental method in an unusual way: "[Derrida has a] very differ
ent way of posing the transcendental question: namely, by asking what conditions of
impossibility mark out the limits of Kantian conceptual critique." NORRIS, supra note
5, at 200. That is, Derrida can be understood as asking what are the conditions that
must be denied or oppressed to render understanding possible.
1 14. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 62.
1 15. For example, when Derrida deconstructs the privileging of speech over writ
ing, he states that writing will always "be the outside." Id. at 31. In other words, writ
ing, which is in this case the Other or the supplement, is not just on the outside, but
rather it is the outside. See also DERRIDA, Plato, supra note 3 (deconstructing Plato's
Phaedrus, which focuses on the importance of speech over writing).
1 16. Cf. STEPHEN K. WHITE, POLmCAL THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM 16
(1991) (recognizing that deconstruction is political because it often exposes power
where reason alone previously appeared).
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Derrida: "Yes, but what legitimates tradition? Tradition arises
partly through violence and deception."
Gadamer: "Your desire for legitimacy merely reenacts modernist
metaphysics. What do you want? A

stable foundation?"

Derrida: "You are right. But you make exactly the point I am try
ing to stress. There is no legitimating ground for meaning other than
tradition, but there is, in turn, no legitimating ground for tradition itself.
Tradition is neither completely legitimate nor illegitimate.1 17 Under
standing, therefore, necessarily is based on blindness and hypocrisy as
we ignore and deny the violence and deception within tradition." 1 1 8
Gadamer: "Yes, but that's exactly the point. We do communicate.
We do understand. These are practical activities that necessarily con
tinue without legitimating foundations."
Derrida: "Yes, but the violence, the oppression, the denial . . . . "
And so on. To Gadamer, this debate is inexhaustible. A

new per

spective constantly comes into being as our horizons shift, but nonethe
less we continue along in our pra�atic fashion - communicating, un
derstanding,

and

interpreting.

To

Derrida,

this

tension

between

philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction is undecidable. We are
caught in a never-ending dialectic between the necessity and inade
quacy of our linguistic forms. Both Derrida and Gadamer might agree,
however, that we do not need to choose between hermeneutics and
deconstruction. In fact, a choice does not even make sense: 1 19 philo
sophical hermeneutics and deconstruction represent different planes or

1 17. In writing about law and justice, Derrida observes:
Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the
law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a vi
olence without ground. Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, in
the sense of "illegal." They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding
moment.
Derrida, Law, supra note 3, at 943.
1 18. See NORRIS, supra note 3, at 197-98.
1 19. For example, Derrida suggests that he, like everybody else, engages in the
practical activity of interpretation when he acknowledges that he always is "analyzing,
judging, evaluating this or that discourse." Jacques Derrida, Like the Sound of the Sea
Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 1 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 590, 631 (Peggy
Kamuf trans., 1988) [hereinafter Derrida, Sound of the Sea]; cf DERRIDA, Structure,
supra note 3, at 292-93 (stating that two forms of interpretation are "absolutely irrecon
cilable," so there is no "question of choosing"). Gadamer maintains that hermeneutics
and deconstruction both try to continue Heidegger's effort to overcome metaphysics,
though they do so along different paths. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Destruktion and
Deconstruction, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 102, 109;
see also Fred Dallmayr, Self and Other: Gadamer and the Hermeneutics of Difference,
5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 515-16 (1993) (observing that to Gadamer, deconstruction
contains insights that are germane to hermeneutics).
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axes in postmodern interpretivism. They both help us to comprehend
the hermeneutic act, or how we come to understand a text (legal or oth
erwise). Philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction thus comple
ment each other in that hermeneutics illuminates the affirmative coming
into being of meaning, while deconstruction stresses the limits of com
munication and understanding. 1 20 This recognition takes us to Balkin
and his discussion of deconstruction and justice.
B.

Postmodern Vertigo

In 1990, Derrida published Force of Law: The "Mystical Founda
tion of Authority. " 1 21 At that time, Derrida noted that although decon

struction often had appeared not to address the problem of justice,
deconstruction had "done nothing but address [justice], if only ob
liquely, unable to do so directly." 122 In Force of Law, however, Derrida
focused on the relation between deconstruction and justice by exploring
how the violence (or force) of law often is deemed just or legitimate.123
Derrida concluded that a " 'mystical' limit" appears at the origin of
law as law claims to rest on ultimately ungrounded authority.124 Justice
itself, according to Derrida, is always displaced; it is never fully exper
ienced. Justice is an "infinite demand:" 125 we constantly desire justice,
but fulfillment of our desire always remains just beyond our reach. 1 26

120. Using Balkin's terms, I might argue that philosophical hermeneutics and
deconstruction exist in a "nested opposition." As Balkin describes this state:
To deconstruct a conceptual opposition is to show that the conceptual opposition
is a nested opposition - in other words, that the two concepts bear relations of
mutual dependence as well as mutual differentiation. For example, we might dis
cover that they have elements in common, which become salient in some con
texts, but that in other contexts we note very important differences between them,
so that they are not the same in all respects. In fact, we would note that the
meaning of each depends in part on our ability to distinguish it from the other in
some contexts.
Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 153.
121. Derrida, Law, supra note 3.
122. Id. at 935. Derrida adds that deconstructionists seek to intervene and change
the polis and social world, not through strategic and controlled intervention, but "in the
sense of maximum intensification of a transformation in progress." Id. at 931-33.
123. Derrida asked the following question: what is the difference between, on the
one hand, the force of law that is just or, at least, is deemed legitimate, and on the other
hand, force or violence that is unjust? See id. at 927.
124. Id. at 943.
125. Id. at 955.
126. Derrida states:
[T]here is no justice without this experience, however impossible it may be, of
aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a desire, a demand for
justice whose structure wouldn't be an experience of aporia would have no
chance to be what it is, namely, a call for justice. Every time that something
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Balkin's article, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Jus
1
tice, 21 reacts to Derrida by, in effect, asking why we constantly desire
justice when we seem forever unable to reach it. How do we, in other
words, explain the infinite demand for justice? 1 28 Balkin's article, by
trying to explain this infinite demand, can be read not only as a re
sponse to Derrida, but also, in part, as a response to Patterson's charge
that postmodern interpretivism is relativistic, solipsistic, and undermines
social critique. 1 29 Balkin declares unequivocally that deconstruction "is
decidedly not nihilistic."1 30 I agree with this sentiment and with many
of Balkin's other pronouncements regarding deconstruction and justice.
For example, I concur with Balkin when he says:
The deconstructor critiques for the purpose of betterment; she seeks out
unjust or inappropriate conceptual hierarchies in order to assert a better
ordering. Hence, her argument is always premised on the' possibility of
an alternative to existing norms that is not simply different, but also more
just, even if the results of this deconstruction are imperfect and subject to
further deconstruction. Such a deconstruction assumes that it is possible
to speak meaningfully of the more or the less just; it decidedly rejects the
claim that nothing is more just than anything else, or that all things are
equally just.131

Nonetheless, I strongly disagree with Balkin's ultimate conclusions
regarding deconstruction and justice. He seemingly has experienced
postmodern vertigo: an avowed postmodernist, he looked in the mirror,
and saw another mirror, and another, and another. Suddenly, he felt
sick, as if he were spinning out of control. So, instinctively, he reached
down and grabbed for a piece of firm, modernist ground. Balkin insists
comes to pass or turns out well, every time that we placidly apply a good rule to
a particular case, to a correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant
judgment, we can be sure that law (droit) may find itselfaccounted for, but cer
tainly not justice. Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation,
and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calcu
late with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as im
probable as they are necessary, ofjustice, that is to say of moments in which the
decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule.
Id. at 947.
127. Balkin, supra note 7.
128. Although Balkin focuses his discussion on Derrida's Force of Law, Balkin
also discusses Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 812 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1989), and Derrida, Sound of the Sea, supra note

1 1 9.

129. I do not mean to suggest that Balkin expressly intended to respond to Patter
son. He did not In fact, Patterson's article was published after Balkin's. Nonetheless,
Balkin responds to the type ofcharge articulated by Patterson.
130. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 142.
131. Id. at 1 141-42; see supra note 120 (I am comfortable with Balkin's concept
of nested oppositions).
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that for Derrida's arguments on justice to make sense, Derrida "must be
committed to a transcendental conception of deconstruction, whether or
not he specifically recognizes this fact." 132 I do not wish to debate ex
actly what Derrida must be committed to or what he intended to write;

I am, however, interested in further exploring the relation between
deconstruction and justice. In particular, Balkin's concept of transcen
dental deconstruction appears intriguing and original, but is ultimately
misleading.
According to Balkin, transcendental deconstruction is the only way
to explain our infinite demand for justice, our "inexhaustible drive." 133
Balkin writes:
The essence of what I am calling transcendental deconstruction [is] the
interval between the human capacity for judgment and evaluation that in
evitably and necessarily transcends the creations of culture, and the pre
scriptions and evaluations of that culture, which in turn articulate and ex
emplify human values like justice. It is in this sense that transcendental
deconstruction depends, as Platonism itself does, on a conception of val
ues that "go beyond" the positive norms of culture and convention. But
these transcendent values do not come to us in a fully determinate form;
they need culture to tum their inchoate sense into an articulated concep
tion. And these transcendent values do not exist in an imaginary Platonic
Heaven; they exist rather in the wellsprings of the human soul. 134

Hence, we have an inchoate sense of and inexhaustible drive for justice
that do not arise from culture or tradition, but rather emerge from "the
wellsprings of the human soul." 135 All cultural manifestations of our
"sense of justice" 136 are inadequate because they fail to fulfill our urge
to attain justice; our sense of justice necessarily transcends concrete cul
tural productions.137 Since our sense of and urge for justice transcend
culture, Balkin posits their emergence from the human soul.

132. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 154 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 1 140.
134. Id. at 1 139 (emphasis added in part).
135. Balkin elsewhere refers to justice as one of "those indeterminate values or
urges located in the human soul, which human beings articulate through positive moral
ity and cultural conventions, and which nevertheless always escape this articulation."
Id. at 1 139.
136. See, e.g., id. at 1 141, 1 155.
137. As Balkin observes:
[H]uman cultural creations will always fail to be perfectly just, but not because
they are defective copies of a determinate standard. Their imperfection arises
from the necessary inadequation that must exist between an indeterminate and in
exhaustible urge and any concrete and determinate articulation of justice. This re
lationship of inadequacy between culture and value is what we mean by "tran
scendence." The goal of transcendental deconstruction is to rediscover this
transcendence where it has been forgotten.
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In fact, Balkin surprisingly insists that transcendental deconstruc
tion saves us from nihilism, that persistent modernist hobgoblin. In
Balkin's own words, "[A] transcendental approach to deconstruction
[is] the only approach that can rescue deconstruction from the nihilistic
abyss of infinite meaning." 138 Balkin reasons that the transcendental
reach into the wellsprings of the human soul is necessary for social cri
tique. Critique, he claims, cannot be immanent; it cannot arise from
within culture itself.
[T]o say that positive norms are inadequate - and hence in order to
deconstruct them - we must refer to values that lie beyond the norms
we are critiquing and that serve as the source of our criticism, even if we
believe that the values we wish to uphold are to some extent realized in
our culture. Suppose that we denied that we need concern ourselves with
transcendental values: Suppose we assert that we are only interested in
engaging in an "immanent" critique. In other words, we say that we are
using one aspect of our cultural norms to critique other aspects, and
therefore we need make no reference to anything beyond the positive
norms of our culture. For example, we might use the commitment to
equality expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to criticize the lack of
civil rights for homosexuals in the United States. The question remains,
however, why we saw a particular aspect of our cultural practices as a
worthy basis for our critique and another aspect as unworthy. Since both
are equally aspects of our culture, culture by itself cannot serve as a
norm to decide between them.139

Balkin admits that one might nonetheless insist that we can use
one aspect of our culture to critique other aspects. Balkin argues, how
ever, that to do so we must allow one element of our culture to take
precedence over another merely because it predominates quantitatively
throughout society. I agree with Balkin's rejection of this rather
nonradical form of critique, which would do nothing more than con
servatively reinforce the status quo.140 But Balkin then claims that in or
der to explain how we are enabled to critique our own cultural norms,
we must turn to "transcendent norms of justice." To Balkin, there is no
other way to attain a critical viewpoint. Again, he maintains that these
norms transcend culture: "Although we may find these norms partially
realized in portions of our own culture, these inadequate articulations
do not exhaust their meaning for us." 141 And more important, if the

Id. at 1 141.
138. Id. at 1 155 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 1175 (footnote omitted).
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1 175-76 (emphasis added).
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norms transcend culture, they must, in Balkin's opinion, arise from the
human soul.
By positing a human soul that somehow stands prior to and be
yond the reach of culture - a precultural human soul - Balkin be
comes a type of neo-liberal, emphasizing the individual and her per
sonal responsibility. Balkin, naturally, urges us to follow his lead:
[We must] abandon antihumanism and to reemphasize the importance of
individual subjects in the creation of a culture that in tum creates
them. . . . [Derrida's] arguments about justice become incoherent unless
he assumes the existence of individuals who are more than the products
of cultural writing, and who can bear a responsibility to others, whether
this responsibility is infinite or indefinite.142

Balkin's argument suggests that either the individual stands prior
to and above culture or the individual becomes a culturally programmed
automaton. Faced with this choice, Balkin of course insists that the in
dividual must stand prior to and above culture; otherwise, the concept
of personal responsibility becomes moot. By thus separating the indi
vidual subject from the cultural (external) world, Balkin reenacts mod
ernist metaphysics - which postmodern interpretivism of course re
jects. This metaphysical return to modernism pushes Balkin along
toward other errors, as hermetic modernist lines and categories begin to
appear. For instance, I agree when Balkin argues that deconstruction
can be understood, in part, as a method, but in his hands, deconstruc
tion appears to become no more than a method - a method to be used
by responsible neo-liberal individuals as they pursue certain goals or
values, such as justice.143 Hence, Balkin suggests that deconstruction
and justice are radically distinct. Indeed, he calls his own article an
"encounter between deconstruction and justice,"144 which resembles an
"encounter between two parties."145 He envisions justice as a human
value and drive, while deconstruction becomes a method that merely
helps us pursue our sense of justice.

1 42. Id. at 1 1 85. Balkin expressly acknowledges the tendency to modernist liber
alism inherent in his position: "[W]hen Derrida discusses [ethical responsibilities], one
could easily be forgiven for mistaking his discourse with familiar liberal notions of au
tonomy and free will." Id. at 1 186.
1 43. Cf. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TExAs L. REV. 1 627,
1 694-95 (1991) (accusing Balkin of using deconstruction as just another analytical tool
because he mistakenly sees Derrida through subject-object metaphysics).
-144. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 131.
1 45. Id.
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Balkin suddenly looks like Kant reincarnate.1 46 Just as Kant's tran
scendental argument posits a noumenal self existing outside of the phe
nomenal world, Balkin's transcendental argument posits a human soul
existing prior to and above culture. Kant does so to explain human ex
perience and knowledge without sacrificing free will, while Balkin does
so to explain our inchoate sense of and inexhaustible drive for justice
without sacrificing individual responsibility. Postmodern interpretivism,
however, renders Balkin's Kantian turn unnecessary. Interpretivism does
not undermine responsibility and the drive for justice, as Balkin fears.
Balkin, in fact, has it exactly backward.
C.

On Justice

Postmodern interpretivism can explain how we come to understand
justice as a value and as an inexhaustible drive. Although not a neat di
vision, philosophical hermeneutics contributes more to our understand
ing of justice as a value, while deconstruction contributes more to our
understanding of the urge for justice. From a Gadamerian viewpoint,
justice is a contested concept within our communal traditions. As with
any concept, we open to the meaning of justice, not because our souls
transcend culture, but rather because we participate in our communal
traditions an.d culture. Contrary to Balkin's suggestion, oilr sense of jus
tice does not come from outside our own cultural context or horizon,
but from within it. The ontological quality of our being-in-the-world
does not undermine justice or eliminate responsibility to others. Instead,
the meanings of justice and responsibility come into being exactly be
cause of our being-in-the-world. 1 47
In short, our sense or meaning of justice is socially produced. Con
sequently, from this perspective, Balkin's argument immediately goes
awry when he designates the human soul as the origin or wellspring for
our sense of and urge for justice. By positing a precultural human soul,
Balkin ignores one of the central messages of postmodern interpretiv
ism: that we can never be outside of our own horizon. We always and
already stand within our communal traditions or culture. There is no
outside. Even if we are born with some precultural drives or values such as justice - our being-in-the-world is so culturally saturated that
a search for a precultural pearl buried somewhere beneath the cultural

146. For a collection of some of Kant's most important writings, see lMMANuEL

KANT. KA.NT SELECTIONS (Theodore M. Greene ed., 1929).
147. Hence, Balkin appears to contradict the thrust of his argument when he writes

that "culture and language do not efface human autonomy but are the conditions of its
very possibility." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 1 86.
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waves seems at best irrelevant and at worst nonsensical. We should fo
cus not on a futile search for pristine pearls, but rather on understanding
the social and cultural construction of communication, values, and so
cial reality.148
Besides explaining how we come to have a sense or value of jus
tice, philosophical hermeneutics also helps us to understand our inex
haustible urge for justice - that is, the impatient movement of our
sense of justice. As already stated, justice is a contested concept within
our communal traditions. If truth keeps happening, as philosophical her
meneutics maintains, then the truth or meaning of justice keeps happen
ing. The meaning of justice cannot be exhausted; it moves with our
shifting horizons as we enter into ever-new contexts. 1 49 Moreover, our
inexhaustible drive for justice is linked to the movement of tradition. As
previously discussed, even our traditions are constantly being trans
formed. Traditions are neither fixed and precisely bounded entities nor
are they passed on to individuals through some precise method or
mechanical process. The boundaries of any tradition are always con
tested, always constituted and reconstituted, and this constant reconsti
tution always is simultaneously constructive and destructive. Thus,
while the concept of a tradition helps us to grasp or understand the so
cial construction of reality - our being-in-the-world - we should not
attempt to reify or reduce any actual tradition (or even the concept of a

148. Balkin's turn to precultural human drives and values is especially surprising
given that he apparently has accepted the postmodernist emphasis on culture and tradi
tion in his other writings. For example, in another recent article, he notes:
A jurisprudence of the subject is above all a cultural jurisprudence, for it is cul
ture that creates legal subjects as subjects
The beholder [or subject] is not fully in control of what she sees; she is part
of a larger legal and political culture that shapes the very forms of her under
standing. She does not choose the terms of her ideology or social construction.
Rather she chooses through them; they form the framework within which her
choices are understood and made.
Balkin, Understanding, supra note 36, at 108. Balkin's unexpected transition, however,
is not unprecedented in critical theory. In a somewhat similar transformation, Max
Horkheimer moved from a critique of ideology to a struggle for a "theological mo
ment" in philosophy that emphasized a human longing to transcend reality. See DAYID
HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRrr!CAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS 198
.

.

.

•

(1980).
149. Consequently, I would avoid abstract and definitive statements regarding the
content of justice. For example, in many contexts, I would agree with Balkin's state
ment that "[t]he demand for an increase of justice is not necessarily the demand for in
creased responsibility. It is rather the demand for an appropriate apportionment of re
sponsibility." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1150 (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, I cannot
accede to the decontextual thrust of his very next sentence: "That is what 'just' means
- neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount of responsibility for each
person." Id. (emphasis added).
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tradition) into a single linguistic formulation or a fixed object.1so Cer
tainly, then, specific concepts such as justice, which are parts of our tra
ditions, necessarily remain constantly in flux. The movement of tradi
tion, in short, helps drive our insatiable urge for justice.
Although philosophical hermeneutics thus facilitates comprehen
sion of our inexhaustible urge for justice, deconstruction more fully il
luminates this urge. Translating our Gadamerian analysis into Derridean
terms, we would say that any conception or meaning of justice is
merely a signifier, not a stable signified. There is a continual play of
justice: justice is never sufficiently present to halt the play of differ
ences.1s1 Whereas Gadamer would consider the meaning of justice to be
inexhaustible, Derrida would consider it undecidable. In any context,
whenever we label an event or action as just, there is necessarily the
trace of the Other hiding in the margins of our understanding. Within
each hermeneutic act in which the meaning of justice comes into being,
there is injustice. Each act o justice violently and duplicitously ex

J

cludes, denies, and oppresses ·some Other.1s2 Hence, justice cannot be
fulfilled; it is always displaced.1s3
Balkin, then, mistakenly argues that Derridean deconstruction must
be augmented in order to explain our inexhaustible drive for justice. Be
cause of this mistake, he looks outside of deconstruction to the well
springs of the human soul. But deconstruction does not need to be aug
mented:

the

play

of signifiers

Christopher Norris declares,

drives

our sense

of justice.

As

"deconstruction is always already at

150. See Adam Thurschwell, Reading the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 275,
312-17 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1994).
151. To a degree, my understanding of the relation between deconstruction and
justice tends to merge Foucault with Derrida. Foucault tends to be oriented to the socio
logical and historical, while Derrida tends to be oriented to the philosophical. See ROY
BOYNE, FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA: THE OTHER SIDE OF REASON 1 1 4 (1990); Hoy,
supra note 3, at 58-62. Compare DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3 with
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) and
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978). To
me, justice is a sociological phenomenon, not merely a philosophical question.
152. The social theorist Niklas Luhmann, in articulating the autopoietic theory of
law, explains that a legal system must have a binary code - justice versus injustice and must exclude both contradictions - justice is injustice, or injustice is justice. See
Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 136, 140 (Shierry Weber
Nicholsen trans.) (1989). From this viewpoint, then, one can easily understand why so
many legal scholars consider deconstruction so threatening to a legal system. The con
cept of a legal system, at least as described by Luhmann, is destabilized by the decon
structive notion that justice always contains injustice.
153. Cf. Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in LEGAL HERME
NEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 297, 305-06 (observ
ing that every horizon of understanding is itself an engine of change).
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work." 154 Balkin's conception of the soul gives us nothing that, in our
being-in-the-world, we do not already have - an insatiable urge for
justice. Yet, in return for his transcendental effort, Balkin suffers a sig
nificant political cost. By positing the human soul as the source of our
sense of and urge for justice, Balkin obscures a radical political point
- that humans have a propensity to perpetrate at least as much injus
tice as justice. In fact, I could argue (but I will not) that human history
- the Holocaust, slavery, the Inquisition, Jim Crow - demonstrates an
inexhaustible drive for cruelty and indifference. In this light, Balkin's
human soul appears just a bit too noble and cheerful.
Perhaps Balkin's modernist metaphysical twist, which induced him
to separate sharply deconstruction from justice, led him to overlook the
hermeneutic and sociological significance of deconstruction. Indeed, in

Force ofLaw, Derrida stated that " [d]econstruction is justice." iss While

I would not absolutely equate deconstruction and justice, I do insist that
they are inseparable - or that they should be so. In particular, the
deconstructive focus on the Other ought to be a central aspect of justice.
The insatiable drive to reveal violence and deception, to uncover denial,
exclusion, and oppression, should remain at the forefront of justice. In
stead of contemplating and pursuing an affirmative vision of justice, we
should focus on what might be called deconjustice - an endless effort
to eradicate injustice.156 Consequently, I would modify Balkin's concep
tion of the virtuous person. In Balkin's eyes:
To be just we must construct examples of justice using the indetenninate
urge for justice as our goad rather than as our guide. This means that the
virtuous person is not a good copyist but a good architect. She attempts
to satisfy her sense of justice by constructing just institutions.157

154. NORRIS. supra note 5, at 200 (emphasis omitted).
155. Derrida, Law, supra note 3, at 945 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Derrida

writes: " [D]econstructions have always represented, as I see it, the at least necessary
condition for identifying and combating the totalitarian risk." Derrida, Sound of the Sea,
supra note 119, at 647.
156. Cf. WHITE, supra note 116, at 122-23 (recommending reversal of the justice
injustice priority so that we focus on injustice); Allan C. Hutchinson, Doing the Right
Thing? Toward a Postmodern Politics, 26 LAW & SoCY. REv. 773 (1992) (noting that
postmodemism is an effective theoretical resource for radical transformative politics);
Thurschwell, supra note 150, at 330-32 (claiming that deconstruction is a call to abso
lute justice, to uncover the violence of law). Drucilla Cornell states:
[T]he entire project of the philosophy of the limit [or deconstruction] is driven by
an ethical desire to enact the ethical relation. Again, by the ethical relation I
mean to indicate the aspiration to a nonviolent relationship to the Other, and to
otherness more generally, that assumes responsibility to guard the Other against
the appropriation that would deny her difference and singularity.
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHlLoSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 62 (1992).
157. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1141 (emphasis added).
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To me, the virtuous person focuses less on the construction of just insti
tutions than on the deconstruction of unjust ones. The virtuous person,
in other words, primarily pursues deconjustice, for the diminution of in
justice will produce increasingly just institutions. 158
Ultimately, however, the intimate connection of deconstruction and
justice ends in paradox, not in a determinate relation. 159 Deconstruction
underscores that the Other always lies in the margin - some individu
als and groups always are excluded and denied. Thus, deconstruction
challenges us to justify this violence and oppression or to change. Yet
even if we change, we do not eradicate the Other; some outgroup al
ways exists. But not all outgroups or Others are the same. We should
not necessarily surrender to some social group merely because it has
been oppressed as the Other. Some groups should be oppressed, while
others should not be.1 60 Neo-Nazis, for example, should be oppressed,
but Democrats should not. And in some instances, being open to and in
clusive of some former outgroup risks the suppression of oneself. Even
more perplexing, when we seek to open to an outgroup, we risk impos
ing a different form of subjugation. Instead of ignoring or silencing the
outgroup, we might colonize it by appropriating and altering its mes
sage and by urging its members to assimilate into the dominant
group.16 1 At any rate, these paradoxes mean only that deconstruction
does not produce determinate results. But one should not have expected
otherwise. Postmodern interpretivism neither promises nor provides
foundations, yet it nonetheless remains markedly political.

158. Before anyone started talking about deconstruction, Edmond N. Cahn wrote
that justice "means the active process of remedying or preventing what would arouse
the sense of injustice." EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13-14 (1949)
(emphasis omitted). Cahn, however, considers this sense of injustice to be a natural ca
pacity or predisposition of the human animal. See id. at 24-25. In this regard, then,
Cahn's argument resembles Balkin's emphasis on the wellsprings of the human soul.
159. Cf. Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 5, at 1082-83 (noting that
postmodemism revels in paradoxes).
160. I agree with Balkin on this point. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 162-64; ac
cord WIDTE, supra note 1 16, at 125-42. As Balkin observes: "Justice, it seems, does
not always demand that one speak in the language of the Other, especially when the
Other is not playing by the same rules." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 164.
161. In the words of Stephen K. White:
The delight with the appearance of the other brings with it the urge to draw it
closer. But that urge must realize its limits, beyond which the drawing nearer be
comes a gesture of grasping. And that realization will be palpable only when we
are sensitive to the appearance of the particular other as testimony of finitude.
Then delight will be paired with a sense of grief or mourning at the fragility and
momentary quality of the appearance of the other.
WIDTE, supra note 1 16, at 90.
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CONCLUSION
Dennis Patterson worries about an infinite regress of interpreta
tions. J.M. Balkin worries about our inexhaustible urge to justice.
Neither need worry. Postmodern interpretivism is a social reality. We do
not get the opportunity to accept or reject it: postmodern interpretivism
is our being-in-the-world. Philosophical hermeneutics explains how we
come to understand a text without falling into an infinite regress, and
hermeneutics and deconstruction explain how we constantly pursue jus
tice even as it always eludes our grasp.
Yet, theorizing can matter. The articulation and advocacy of a the
ory of postmodern interpretivism might have some political valence. In
particular, theories of philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction
can help us to stop worrying about relativism, solipsism, and nihilism;
interpretivist theories can turn our attention away from these modernist
hobgoblins and toward social issues instead. Thus, to Patterson, partly
because he rejects postmodern interpretivism, the task of jurisprudence
is still largely descriptive and analytical - and therefore conservative.
But to me, the task of jurisprudence is first and foremost critical - to
uncover the denial and exclusion of the Other within the law.
At the same time, I do not wish to overstate the political signifi
cance of this article. While I fmd it personally rewarding to make a po
litical statement (as I do here), I am not deluded enough to believe that
I am changing the world in some significant and immediate fashion.
Nobody is going to run out tomorrow to restructure economic relations
in American society because I have argued that understanding is inter
pretation. More specifically, I do not believe that this article even can
influence Patterson. He appears so strongly committed to his profes
sional identity as a certain type of Wittgensteinian pragmatist that he is
unlikely to consider seriously any alternative positions. Balkin, how
ever, might be another story. I hope that his case of postmodern vertigo
was only temporary. For several years, Balkin has been one of the few
legal writers willing to explore postmodern issues such as the social
construction of reality, the role of ideology, and the problem of social
critique.162 Losing him to some updated form of modernism would be a
shame. Perhaps he will soon return to his postmodern self. The self,
though, is such a modernist concept, but then again, vestiges of mod
ernism always seem to be lying in the margins of postmodernism like a soul in deconstruction?

162. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
LJ. 743 (1987); J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1966 (1992); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1991)
(book review).

